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The Use and Abuse of Comparative
Negligence in Products Liability
AARON D. TWERSKI*
The state of the law concerning the role of plaintiffs conduct ii
product liability litigation is unsettled and confused. The courts hac
barely become acclimated to strict liability when they were forcec
to encounter the comparative negligence revolution and assess its
impact on the newly-emerging theory.' It is not an understatement
to say that the results have been uneven.' But worse than the lack
of uniformity has been the lack of incisive analysis in the judicial
opinions. As could be expected, the bar has split sharply on the ap-
propriateness of the comparative negligence defense in strict pro-
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tions of Professor William Donaher of the Duquesne Law School and Professors Alvin
Weinstein and Henry Piehler of Carnegie-Mellon University-co-members of that NSF
study team-are gratefully acknowledged.
The author is also grateful to Professor Linda Champlin of Hofstra University
School of Law and Professor David Owen of the University of South Carolina School of
Law for having reviewed earlier drafts of this article. Their comments and suggestions
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'Although prior to 1969 six states had adopted comparative negligence by
statute, the dramatic shift in the adoption of comparative negligence has taken place
since that time. Since 1969, 26 states have shifted to comparative negligence. Several
courts have embraced comparative negligence by judicial opinion. Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.
2d 431 (Fla. 1973). For a comprehensive list of the statutes adopted as of 1976 see
Fleming, Forward. Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L.
REV. 239 (1976). To that compilation should now be added Pennsylvania. 17 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 2101, 2102 (Supp. 1977). For an incisive analysis of the comparative negligence
doctrine see V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974).
2The following courts have applied comparative fault in product liability cases:
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 547 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1977) (The West court, apparent-
ly, would not apply comparative fault when the fault is in failing to discover a defect
or to guard against the possibility of its existence); Edwards v. Sears & Roebuck, 512
F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676
(D.N.H. 1972); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alas.
1976), modifying the court's earlier decision in the same case reported at 543 P.2d 209
(Alas. 1975); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Dippel v. Sciano,
37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Contra, Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795
(8th Cir. 1976) (holding that applying Nebraska slight-gross comparison statute, NEB.
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ducts liability.' It will be argued in the ensuing pages that the ex-
cesses of either extreme should be avoided. Comparative negligence
should not be applied across the board in product liability cases. To
do so would significantly reduce the responsibility which has been
justifiably placed on the manufacturing community.' On the other
hand, it is just not true that the structure of product liability law
precludes the application of comparative negligence in all cir-
cumstances. In those cases where the plaintiff has breached his
responsibility for maintenance, care, and use of a product outside of
certain well-defined parameters, serious consideration should be
given to the reduction of plaintiff's recovery as a matter of fairness
to the defendant. Indeed, it will be suggested that the issue of com-
parative negligence vel non should not depend on whether the
theory of recovery is negligence or strict liability, but rather should
depend on the type of product defect being litigated and the nature
of the contributory fault under consideration. After examining the
role of comparative negligence in relation to plaintiff behavior,
either as contributory negligence or assumption of the risk, this Ar-
ticle will probe the use of comparative negligence as a means of
avoiding exceedingly difficult cause in fact and/or proximate cause
problems. There is substantial evidence that comparative negligence
will be used by courts and juries as a method of compromising
causation questions which heretofore have been considered all-or-
nothing issues by the law.
I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS-AND THEN ANOTHER THREE FACTORS
The discussion of the policy factors which either support or
militate against the use of contributory negligence in products
liability has focused to date on the theoretical justifications for
REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1964), would be confusing in a strict liability case); Buccery v.
General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976); Horn v. General
Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976); Hoelter v.
Mohawk, 170 Conn. 495, 365 A.2d 1064 (1976) (dissent chastising majority for not ap-
plying comparative fault).
'Feinberg, The Applicability of a Comparative Negligence Defense in a Strict
Products Liability Suit Based on Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d (Can
Oil and Water Mix?), 42 INS. COUNS. J. 39 (1975); Fleming, Forward. Comparative
Negligence at Last-by Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239, 268 (1976); Schwartz,
Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171 (1974); Note, Pro-
ducts Liability, Comparative Negligence and the Allocation of Damages Among Multi-
ple Defendants, 50 S. CALIF. L. REV. 73 (1976).
'See text accompanying notes 45 to 49 infra.
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strict product liability.' It is argued that if the purpose of strict
liability is to control risk exposure at the point of design or
manufacture, it then becomes inappropriate to bar recovery because
of plaintiff's unreasonable conduct.' Furthermore, in those cases in
which plaintiffs claim is based on some form of express warranty it
is unfair to bar plaintiffs recovery because plaintiff was foolish
enough to rely on the defendant's representations.' On the other
hand, advocates of the affirmative defenses argue that strict liability
does not stem from an attempt to redefine basic relationships bet-
ween manufacturers and consumers, but rather derives from the in-
ordinately difficult proof problems which faced a plaintiff seeking
recovery in a product liability case.' To the extent that strict liabili-
ty merely reflects a belief that in a product defect case the defen-
dant is guilty of non-provable negligence, then there is no justifica-
tion for limiting the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk.
Although the arguments which proceed from an examination of
strict liability theory shed light on the appropriateness of utilizing
affirmative defenses, they do not tell the whole story. There are
perspectives which stem from the peculiar nature of product liabili-
ty relationships which cut across doctrinal lines and which should
affect our decision as to whether the plaintiff should be barred or
have his recovery reduced. The following arguments should be con-
sidered without regard to whether the theory for recovery is
negligence, strict liability, or express warranty.
A. Multi-risk Product Exposure v. Uni-risk
Plaintiff Exposure
In evaluating the ultimate fairness of barring or reducing the
plaintiff's recovery by the percentage of plaintiffs fault, the dispari-
ty between the kinds of risks created by plaintiff and defendant
should be explored." Products liability claims, especially design
'See Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968
UTAH L. REV. 267; Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's
Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627 (1968); Noel, Defective Products: Abnor-
mal Use, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93
(1972).
'Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
'Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).
'Levine, supra note 5, at 648; Noel, supra note 5, at 110; Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1956).
'Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the
Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1974); Twerski, From Defect to Cause to
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defect and failure-to-warn cases are not one-on-one situations. In the
classic encounter between a negligent defendant and a contributori-
ly negligent plaintiff, the defendant exposes the plaintiff to a risk
and the plaintiff, by his negligent conduct, exposes himself to a risk.
Equitable considerations preclude a plaintiff from total recovery
when the plaintiff's conduct is similar in scope and in nature to that
of the defendant. However, in a product liability case based on
defective design, the defendant is not facing the plaintiff one-on-one.
The defendant distributes to the world at large a product which is
unreasonably dangerous and one can statistically calculate that it
will bring harm to a percentage of users." Thus, for example, if a
drill press is designed without a safety guard, there is little question
that somewhere in the manufacturing community there will be a
plaintiff who is destined to have his hand severed, due either to his
negligence or to inadvertence. 1 One noted author has likened this to
an intentional tort." In essence, once a product with a design defect
is marketed, we know with substantial certainty that there will be a
victim-we just do not know his name. Thus, it seems to me that,
whether the theory is strict liability or negligence, we should be
reluctant to reduce plaintiff's recovery. The reasons are several.
First, as a matter of simple fairness, the comparison between defen-
dant's act and plaintiff's act leads to the conclusion that the defen-
dant's act is certain to cause damage to any plaintiff who interacts
with the product in the same manner as has this plaintiff. 3 It might
Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV.
297 (1977).
11R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 66 (1972) states:
Most accidental injuries are intentional in the sense that the injurer knew
that he could have reduced the probability of the accident by taking addi-
tional precautions. The element of intention is unmistakable when the tort-
feasor is an enterprise which can predict from past experience that it will in-
flict a certain number of accidental injuries every year.
"The safety guard cases make up a substantial portion of product liability
literature. See, e.g., Elder v. Crawley Book Mach. Co., 441 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1971);
Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Yoder Co. v.
General Copper & Brass Co., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp.,
60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571,
384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976); Meyer v. Gehl Co., 36 N.Y.2d 759, 329 N.E.2d 666, 368
N.Y.S.2d 834 (1975); Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968).
'
2See Posner, supra note 10; Owen, The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Im-
plications on Rules of Liability and Defense in Product Liability Actions, 10 IND. L.
REV. 769 (1977). See also text accompanying notes 72-75 infra. But see Epstein, Inten-
tional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391, 392 (1975).
"
3Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972); Schuh v. Fox River
Tractor Co., 63 Wis. 2d 728, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974), demonstrate the conflicting at-
titudes adopted by the courts to this problem. Schuh is discussed at length in Twerski,
[Vol. 10:797
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be argued that this disparity in fault should enter into the con-
sideration of what percentage of fault is to be attributed to the
defendant and what percentage to plaintiff.' Yet, this is easier said
than done.
A lawsuit proceeds with plaintiff and defendant in a one-on-one
adversarial setting. If the plaintiff seeks to broaden the scope of the
inquiry to demonstrate that the defendant's activity affects others
in a negative manner, the defendant may legitimately claim that the
evidence is inadmissible."5 Even if the evidence is admissible for a
limited purpose, the plaintiff is not free to paint defendant's product
as faulty outside the context of the individual case." It thus remains
for the court, in formulating its legal doctrine, to take into account
the limitations which exclude such considerations from the litigation
process. If a design defect bears the potential of great public harm
and the certainty of individual harm, then it behooves the court in
structuring its doctrine of comparative negligence to consider this
factor. The court cannot expect that all this testimony will come out
in the trial process since the trial is, by definition, limited to the
direct adversarial setting.
There is a second consideration which is difficult to assess, but
which must be taken into account nonetheless. Whether a defendant
faces great financial exposure as a result of a design defect is not
easy to determine. Many design defects, because of their obvious
nature, bear a substantially reduced probability of producing harm.
With the decline of the patent-danger rule, it may well be that pro-
ducts with such obvious defects will be defined as unreasonably
From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability
Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 346 (1977). In Bexiga, in now famous language, the
court said:
We think this case presents a situation where the interests of justice dictate
that contributory negligence be unavailable as a defense to either the
negligence or strict liability claims.
The asserted negligence of plaintiff-placing his hand under the ram
while at the same time depressing the foot pedal-was the very eventuality
the safety devices were designed to guard against. It would be anomalous to
hold that defendant has a duty to install safety devices but a breach of that
duty results in no liability for the very injury the duty was meant to protect
aganst.
60 N.J. at 412, 290 A.2d at 286.
"See Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV.
171, 178 (1974). To the extent that the intentional tort analogy is persuasive, then com-
parative fault should not be applied. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5.?
(1974).
11L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.01(2) (1976); Morris, Proof
of Safety History in Negligence Cases, 61 HARV. L. REV. 205 (1948).
"aId.
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dangerous and thus not socially desirable. 7 We will, therefore, be
faced with a situation in which a manufacturer produces an
unreasonably dangerous product whose harm potential in terms of
numbers is small. Might it not be profitable for defendant to pay out
the verdicts and to continue manufacturing the selfsame product? If
we are to consider comparative negligence as a factor in a product
liability case, we may be reducing the defendant's financial exposure
to the point where maintaining the design defect becomes
economically prudent. A similar concern has led Professor Owen to
the conclusion that we should not remove punitive damages from
the plaintiff's arsenal in product liability litigation when dealing
with a reckless or malicious tortfeasor." The argument would seem
to be particularly strong when a defendant may otherwise be pro-
tected from facing the full force of compensatory damages.
B. Product Liability Law As Representational
A great debate rages as to whether product liability law is
based on unreasonable risk principles which are rooted in negligence
law," primarily tort, or whether it is fundamentally representa-
tional. In a landmark article,2 Professor Shapo has developed the
"For all the relentless academic criticism leveled at the patent-danger rule, the
rule demonstrates continued strength. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS §
28.5 (1956); Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturers'
Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1065 (1973); Twerski,
From Codling, to Bolm to Velez: Tryptych of Confusion, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 489 (1974).
Nevertheless, cases continue to reflect the spirit if not the letter of the patent-danger
rule. Schell v. AMF Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1123 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Nissen Trampoline Co. v.
Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd on procedural
grounds, 358 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 1976); Tibbets v. Ford Motor Co., 358 N.E.2d 460 (Mass.
1976); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976);
Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230
N.W.2d 794 (1975). The better-reasoned cases have abandoned the patent-danger rule
and have opted for a total risk utility analysis. Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550
P.2d 1065 (1976); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr.
629 (1970); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115
(1976).
"Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation 74 MICH. L. REV.
1258, 1282-87 (1976); Owen, The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Implications On
Rules of Liability and Defense in Product Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REV. 769
(1977).
"Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture
and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969); Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); Wade, Strict Tort Liability
of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
2 Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection" Doctrine, Function
and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974).
[Vol. 10:797
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thesis that the crux of product liability litigation lies in consumer
disappointment in product performance.21 Whether or not one agrees
in totality with Professor Shapo's thesis, he has clearly identified a
major theme that runs through the entirety of product liability law.
Its implications for affirmative defenses are most important. If the
line of demarcation between express warranty and implied warran-
ty/strict liability are blurred and one shades almost imperceptibly
into the other, then we must face the implication that a consumer's
reaction to a product has to a great extent been taught to him by
the marketing process. It ill behooves a manufacturer who has en-
couraged certain product behavior, through either overt or subtle
marketing techniques, to raise the defense that the consumer has
failed to follow societal norms for product use and has instead
followed the seller's norms. It smacks of the child who murders his
parents so that he can attend the orphans' picnic. As a matter of
elemental fairness, the defendant should not be permitted the ad-
vantages of product representations which encourage certain kinds
of plaintiff behavior which, in turn, increase sales" and at the same
time use that behavior as a shield against full recovery when the
product misfires at that level of performance. This argument is valid
even if the defendant's representations fail to reach the explicit
level necessary for an express warranty or misrepresentation. 3 The
threshold level for express warranty and misrepresentation is fairly
"Professor Shapo's thesis is:
Judgments of liability for consumer product disappointment should
center initially and principally on the portrayal of the product which is made,
caused to be made or permitted by the seller. This portrayal should be
viewed in the context of the impression reasonably received by the consumer
from representations or other communications made to him about the pro-
duct by various means: through advertising, by the appearance of the pro-
duct, and by the other ways in which the product projects an image on the
mind of the consumer, including impressions created by widespread social
agreement about the product's function. This judgment should take into con-
sideration the result objectively determinable to have been sought by the
seller, and the seller's apparent motivation in making or permitting the
representation or communication.
These determinations of liability should consider, generally, the inte-
grated image of the product against the background of the public communica-
tions that relate to it; and should refer, specifically, to those communications
concerning the characteristics or features of the product principally related
to the element of disappointment, and to the question of whether these
characteristics or features reasonably might have aroused conflict with
respect to the decision to buy or otherwise to encounter the product.
Id. at 1370.
"Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).
"W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTs 694 (1971); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 274 (1972); Shapo, supra note 20, at 1153-92.
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high and plaintiff may not be able to establish it; nonetheless, if the
reality of our marketing system is such that its impact on consumer
behavior is considerable, then contributory or comparative
negligence ought not to be a defense. Again, it might be possible to
argue that such considerations are for a jury, affecting the com-
parison of fault. But, it seems to me again that this is a basic duty
question in which the courts must determine whether the overall
scene of product litigation demands that the law recognize that
subtle but powerful influences encourage plaintiff behavior even
though they may not always be provable in an individual case to the
degree that plaintiff would desire." This is a law-making function for
the court and cannot be delegated to the vagaries of the individual
case and the individual jury.
C. The Anti-Contributory Negligence Mechanism
The discussion with regard to contributory negligence in tort
law generally proceeds from the premise that the defendant and
plaintiff act independently. Through the confluence of events, their
negligent acts coincide to cause damage. To be sure, the act of each
must be within the realm of contemplation of the other for the prox-
imate cause element to be made out for each party. 5 If the plaintiff
is not within the scope of foreseeability of the defendant, or if the
defendant's negligence is not within the scope of the plaintiffs
foreseeability, then the nexus between the act of each to the injury
of the opposing party is not established.
In product liability actions, the scenario is radically different. If
the plaintiff is negligent, the tool of his negligence is the product of
the defendant. Now, if we proceed one step further and determine
that the defendant's negligence was in not providing a device which
would prevent the plaintiff from misusing the product or unwisely
assuming risk, it becomes evident that plaintiffs action in reacting
to the defendant's product as expected should not bar or reduce his
recovery. If the defendant is required by the law to build safety into
a product in order to prevent a plaintiffs negligent response, it
makes little sense to reduce defendant's liability exposure when the
plaintiff has responded as expected." To be sure, there is some
deterrence to be accomplished by penalizing plaintiff for his
2 Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928),
29 COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1929); Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEX. L.
REV. 42 (1962).
"
5 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 244-89, 421-22 (1971).
2
"Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
[Vol. 10:797
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negligent conduct," but the better argument is that the plaintiffs
reactions were, in a sense, built into the product. It is no answer
that the law recognizes comparative negligence in other instances
when the plaintiffs conduct is foreseeble. This is admittedly so.
Without foreseeability, there would be no proximate cause. The dif-
ference lies in the harsh reality that the act of negligence of the
plaintiff and that of the defendant in a non-products case have in-
dependent significance separate and apart from each other. In a pro-
ducts liability action, if the defendant has failed to install an anticon-
tributory negligence button or safety shield, we have decided that
responsibility for that failure is the defendant's. To censure the
plaintiff for failing to act reasonably when that was the very prob-
lem to be guarded against is to march up the hill in order to march
down again.28
II. COMPARING NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY
Although for the reasons set forth above I oppose across-the-
board application of comparative negligence in product liability ac-
tions, it should be noted that the grounds for my opposition are
substantive, not doctrinal. Opposition to the comparative negligence
doctrine in strict product liability cases has been voiced by those
"Fleming, Forward. Comparative Negligence At Last-By Judicial Choice, 64
CALIF. L. REV. 239, 270 (1976); Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence,
42 TENN. L. REV. 171, 179 (1974).
"This is a restatement of the classic argument against use of the assumption of
the risk doctrine. See James, Assumption of Risk Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE
L.J. 185 (1968). Care must be taken to guard against permitting affirmative defenses or
proximate cause arguments from destroying duties which the law has labored to
develop. A recent example of a court's sensitivity to this problem is Parvi v. City of
Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553, 362 N.E.2d 960 (1977). The facts in this case concern two
drunks who were picked up by the police and run out of town in order to dry out. The
drunks were deposited outside of town several hundred feet from the New York
Thruway. One was killed and the other seriously injured by an onrushing car. The
court first recognized a clear duty on the part of police to act reasonably vis-a-vis the
drunks after they had been picked up. The defendant argued that it was the act of the
drunks and not that of the policemen which was the proximate cause of the accident.
In response, Judge Fuchsberg, speaking for the majority, said:
To accept the defendant's argument, that the intoxication was itself the
proximate cause of Parvi's injury as a matter of law, would be to negate the
very duty imposed on the police officers when they took Parvi and Dugan in-
to custody. It would be to march up the hill only to march down again. The
clear duty imposed on the offiers interdicts such a result if, as the jury may
find, their conduct was unreasonable. For it is the very fact of plaintiffs
drunkenness which precipitated the duty once the officers made the decision
to act.
41 N.Y.2d at 555, 362 N.E.2d at 965 (citations omitted).
19771
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who fail to see how one can compare the strict liability of the defen-
dant-a no-fault doctrine-with the negligence of the plaintiff-a
fault doctrine."' In some instances, this doctrinal problem has been
considered so serious that it has caused courts to proclaim that
strict liability is the equivalent of negligence per se.3 0 In another
forum, I have examined this phenomenon at great length. 1 The
short answer to the dilemma of how one can compare strict liability
and negligence is that one must simply close one's eyes and ac-
complish the task. To be sure, we must blind ourselves somewhat to
pristine tort analysis, but the compromise in principle is not ex-
treme and should not bar us from what we believe to be a legitimate
reduction in plaintiff's verdict.
There are two methods for accomplishing the reduction.
A. Focus on Plaintiff's Conduct
If the purpose of comparative negligence is to reduce plaintiff's
recovery by assessing the role that plaintiff's conduct played in
causing his injury, then we are really not involved in a strict com-
parison of fault. Instead, what we are doing is viewing the injury
event in totality and then asking ourselves if it is fair to allow the
plaintiff full compensation for an injury event in which he played an
important role. Although some comparison is inevitable, the reduc-
tion is essentially accomplished by looking at plaintiffs conduct. The
draft Uniform Comparative Fault Act, reflecting this basic perspec-
tive, provides:
(a) In an action based on fault, to recover damages for
injury or death to person or harm to property, any con-
tributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes propor-
tionately the award of compensatory damages, but does not
bar recovery, whether or not the contributory fault
previously constituted a defense, and including situations in
which last clear chance was formally applied.
(b) "Fault" includes negligence, recklessness, breach of
implied warranty, conduct subjecting the actor to strict tort
liability, unreasonable assumption of risk, and failure to
"See authorities cited in note 3 supra.
"°Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 273-74, 238 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1976); Dippel
v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 461, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64 (1967). See also Atkins v. American
Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80
(Fla. 1976).
"Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault -Rethinking Some Pro-
duct Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297 (1977).
[Vol. 10:797
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avoid or mitigate damage. The fault must have an adequate
causal relationship to the damage suffered.
32
Note that the emphasis is not so much on the comparative aspects of
the action; reduction is accomplished by diminishing the award ac-
cording to the plaintiffs contributory fault. 3
B. Equating Defect with Fault
If the administration of justice had to be reconciled with
philosophical purity, then comparison of fault in strict products
liability would not be possible. However, we know that the reasons
for adopting strict liability are multifarious. They stem from a
desire to change risk distribution principles, to fulfill consumer ex-
pectations, and to free the plaintiff from proving fault when it is
supposed that fault is present but cannot be easily demonstrated.'
Given such a multiplicity of reasons for the adoption of strict liabili-
ty, it is not untoward to suggest that the seriousness of defect
should be equated in some rough sense with a percentage of fault.
The draft Uniform Comparative Fault Act suggests the following:
In determining the percentage of fault allocable to each
party, the trier of fact shall consider, on a comparative basis,
both the nature and quality of the conduct of the party and
the extent to which and directness with which the conduct
contributed to cause the damages claimed. 5
In short, it is my thesis that it is simply incorrect to apply com-
parative negligence to a broad range of product liability cases. But
the reason for not applying comparative negligence has little or
nothing to do with the technical problem of making the comparison.
uThe quotation is taken from the May 1, 1977 draft of the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, section 1 [hereinafter cited as May 1, 1977 Draft]. An earlier version of the
Act is discussed in Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault Act- What Should It Pro-
vide?, 10 U. MICH. J. LAW REF. 220 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Wade, Uniform
Act]. The proposed act is scheduled for presentation to the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Law in Vail, Colorado, July 29 through Aug. 5, 1977.
'An earlier version of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act emphasized this
theme by stating that contributory negligence by the claimant "diminishes the award
of compensatory damages proportionately according to the measure of fault attributed
to the claimant." See Wade, Uniform Act, supra note 32. See also Wis. STAT.
§ 895.045 (1973); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
"Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and Assump-
tion of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1972).
'Uniform Comparative Fault Act, May 1, 1977 Draft, supra note 32.
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That issue is, in my opinion, a red herring and should be so iden-
tified. The policy reasons for not applying the defense depend on a
careful identification of the type of case in which the comparative
fault defense will produce an unjust result. Neither the broadside at-
tack on comparative fault nor its uncritical acceptance demonstrates
a fact-sensitive analysis worthy of acceptance.
III. ABUSE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
A. The Second-Collision Case
The prototype for this problem is Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co.,'
in which plaintiff was injured when she was unable to stop her car
on a wet road and caused a rear-end collision with another car
stopped in front of her. The suit was brought against Ford Motor
Co. for second-collision injuries. The hub of the plaintiff's steering
wheel was padded, but in the middle of the padding Ford had in-
serted a plastic Ford emblem from which three sharp prongs pro-
truded. The emblem with the prongs extended above the surface of
the padding. Plaintiff suffered severe injuries upon impact when her
face struck the insignia on the steering wheel.
In a well-considered opinion, the court decided to cast its lot
with those courts which impose second-collision liability. Following
the leading case of Larsen v. General Motors,7 the court found that
an automobile manufacturer has a duty to design a reasonably safe
automobile. Since collisions are a foreseeable phenomenon, the
manufacturer must utilize a reasonably safe design to minimize the
effects of collisions. The court then faced the question of whether
the plaintiff's possible contributory negligence in causing the colli-
sion should be a bar to recovery. Relying on Restatement § 402A,
Comment (n), the court held that a plaintiff's contributory negligence
in failing to discover a defect or guard against the possibility of its
existence, is no defense to a strict liability action. Comment (n) pro-
vides:
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not
based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the
rule applied to strict liability cases (see § 524) applies. Con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when
such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the
defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of
its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory
"503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973).
7391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably
proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly
passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense
under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the
user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the
danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use
of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from
recovery.
Although I am in agreement with the result reached by the
court, my reasons for supporting the court's decision are not limited
to the fact that plaintiffs cause of action was based on strict liabili-
ty rather than negligence. The considerations I have outlined earlier
have direct bearing on the Ellithorpe problem. First, the fault of the
defendant was in designing a product which was not merely capable
of causing harm, but which would almost inevitably do so. The Ford
emblem on the hub of the steering wheel was destined to be im-
planted in some plaintiffs forehead; the large number of Fords
which bore that design assured this result. Second, requiring design
for second-collision safety serves the purpose of protecting the
negligent as well as the non-negligent driver. It is simply in-
conceivable that the law would seek to discriminate against the
negligent driver in a second-collision situation. A collision is a colli-
sion is a collision. It is the defendant's responsiblity to build in suffi-
cient safety to provide plaintiff, in the helpless state of reacting to a
first collision, with as much protection as reasonably possible.38
These arguments seem equally compelling to me whether the
defense is contributory negligence or comparative negligence. The
decision made in declaring the design defective includes an assump-
tion that the plaintiff is deserving of protection. Responsibility for
"Tort buffs will find that this argument bears a striking resemblance to the "last
clear chance" doctrine. Under this doctrine a plaintiffs contributory negligence will
not be a bar if defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. See W. PRO-
SSER, LAW OF TORTS 427 (4th ed. 1971); James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doc-
trine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938). Although some states have retained the last clear
chance approach even after the adoption of comparative negligence, the better argu-
ment is that last clear chance should not survive the advent of comparative negligence.
V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 7.3 (1974).
The reason is that last clear chance was a crude method of comparing fault, thus
negating the harsh effects of contributory negligence as a complete bar. With com-
parative negligence it is now possible to directly confront the nature of plaintiffs con-
tributory fault and reduce his recovery accordingly. In some instances, however, it
may be proper to utilize the last clear chance approach to assist the courts in deciding
whether to engage the comparative fault doctrine. In a case when the defendant's in-
itial design responsibility is to protect against a helpless plaintiff there are strong
policy grounds for not recognizing contributory fault even in its comparative modality.
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that protection should not be lessened merely because the plaintiff
happened to be travelling too fast for road conditions at the time of
the accident. If the law is concerned about deterring plaintiff
negligence through the comparative negligence doctrine, that result
can be accomplished in cases such as this by reducing plaintiff's
recovery for first-collision injuries against another negligent driver.
It should not reduce, by one farthing, her recovery against Ford
Motor Company. Ford had no right to bargain for a better plaintiff,
since the second collision could have occurred just as easily with a
non-negligent plaintiff. It might even be argued that plaintiff's
negligence in driving is not the proximate cause of her second-
collision injuries. Plaintiffs have no reason to foresee that the
automobiles they ride in are booby trapped to cause enhanced injury
in case of collision. However, it should not be necessary to resort to
tortured arguments to accomplish sensible and just results. Com-
parative negligence ought not to diminish clearly delineated duties
merely because a compromise formula is extant.
Care must be taken to define the relationships between the par-
ties so that the fundamental goals of comparative fault are ac-
complished. Slight variations in fact patterns may change the policy
implications drastically. Horn v. General Motors Corp.8" illustrates
the principle. Plaintiff, while driving her car, was forced to swerve
to avoid a car which had suddenly swung into her lane of traffic. As
she steered to the right, plaintiff brought her left hand across the
horn cap in the center of the steering wheel. The horn cap was
defectively designed in that it was too easily removable. Below the
horn cap were three sharp prongs which held it in place. Plaintiff's
chin collided with the sharp prongs and she suffered serious injury.
Plaintiff sought to hold General Motors liable for the aggrava-
tion of her injuries due to the defective design of the horn cap and
the sharp prongs. In affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the
court was faced with the contention that if plaintiff had been wear-
ing her seat belt her injuries would have been much reduced. The
court, citing its previous decision in Luque v. McLean,0 held that
the only defense to a strict liability action was voluntary and
unreasonable assumption of a known risk. Since there was no
evidence that plaintiff was aware that the car had an easily
removable horn cap which masked sharp prongs, the defense was
not allowed.
The dissent by Justice Clark raised the issue of comparative
negligence. He argued that California's judicial adoption of com-
a'17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976).
"08 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
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parative negligence in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.'1 should govern in this
instance. He contended that the equitable principles of comparative
negligence should operate in a strict liability situation as well.
If second-collision liability is to be imposed on General Motors, it
is because there is a need to protect plaintiffs-even negligent or
contributorily negligent plaintiffs-from needless injury when cars
collide. The fault of General Motors is in not designing its car so
that when a driver is involved in a collision his injuries will not be
aggravated. The foreseeability and liability of General Motors could
thus logically attach even to a non-belted plaintiff. An argument can,
however, be made that in this particular case, plaintiffs verdict
ought to be reduced by the percentage of her fault. A court might
take the position that unlike the situation in Ellithorpe v. Ford,"2
where the plaintiff's negligence was in the driving of the car, and
the car manufacturer's liability protected the negligent and non-
negligent driver alike, in the Horn case the negligence of the plain-
tiff was in a sense identical with that of the defendant. Although the
defendant failed to take precautions to protect the plaintiff from
second-collision injuries, it must be admitted that the plaintiff failed
to take precautions to prevent second-collision injuries as well.'"
These issues are difficult and will require careful attention by the
courts. The position of the majority, declining to consider com-
parative negligence in a strict liability situation, and that of the dis-
sent, uncritically accepting the doctrine, both seem wrong.
It might be argued that the inherent intractability of the prob-
lem militates in favor of simply sending all cases in which plaintiff
fault is a factor to a jury under a comparative negligence instruc-
tion. Yet, I cannot divest myself from the belief that law-making
power, in its finest sense, belongs in the hands of the judge." Clear
doctrine will not emerge overnight; but when it does emerge it will
reflect the best judicial assessment of where the duties and respon-
sibilities ought to lie, rather than the foggy non-policy which is the
product of comparative fault analysis.
B. Design Defect-Protecting Plaintiff From Decision-Making
In a recent case, plaintiff was injured while working on a Pan-O-
Mat machine, an apparatus designed to receive roll-shaped pieces of
"13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
4503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973).
'
3The injuries suffered by a plaintiff due to failure to wear a seat belt are second
collision injuries. They are usually occasioned after initial impact with an external
force, which is the primary or first collision.
"The author's sympathies on this question lie with Leon Green. See authorities
cited in note 24 supra.
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bread dough from another machine. At the transfer point the dough
occasionally misses the appropriate cup and falls to the floor
beneath the Pan-O-Mat. In order to collect the fallen dough, the
machine is equipped with an "excess" tray which fits beneath it.
Usually, the excess tray can be removed and emptied without open-
ing the guard doors which block access to the working mechanism of
the machine, including gears, sprockets, etc. On this occasion the
tray was so overfilled that the only way to get it out was to open
the guard door. The machine continued to operate while the guard
door was open and plaintiff noticed that while the tray was away
there was a new accumulation of dough under the machine. He bent
down to clean the area and lost his balance. His arm became en-
tangled in the chain and sprocket mechanism, resulting in eventual
loss of his arm through amputation.
The court, in Schell v. AMF, Inc.,"5 found that under the above-
stated facts defendant was entitled to a directed verdict. It is in-
teresting to reflect on two of the plaintiff's allegations of design
defect in Schelk
(1) The absence of an interlock mechanism which would
shut down the machine when a guard door is open; and
(2) The use of closing mechanisms on the guard doors
which allow the door to be opened quickly and without
reflection.
We have heretofore focused on parameters of product design
which should protect a plaintiff when he either fails to inspect a pro-
duct or fails to contemplate that the product may not always func-
tion properly. I should now like to suggest that in certain instances
when plaintiff is voluntarily and unreasonably assuming a risk his
recovery ought not to be barred, nor should it be reduced, under the
comparative negligence doctrine. I realize that this flies in the face
of the wisdom of the Restatement § 402A, comment (n), which pro-
vides that unreasonable assumption of the risk is a defense to a pro-
duct liability action. Nevertheless, logic would appear to demand the
result I am suggesting.
As noted above, the court in Schell held for defendant, because
it reasoned that defendant had no duty to manufacture a machine
which would prevent a plaintiff from putting himself at so obvious a
risk."6 The court squarely faced the duty issue and found against the
plaintiff. But surely the courts that have recently overruled the pat-
ent danger doctrine might take a more charitable view of such a
"422 F. Supp. 1123 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
"Id. at 1126.
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design defect. 7 A court might very well determine that an interlock
mechanism which prevents plaintiffs from voluntarily placing their
limbs in moving parts is a desirable safety feature. If a court were
to require such a safety device, it would do so because it decided
that plaintiff should be protected from foolish decision-making. In
the Schell case, one could not even argue that such a safety device
should be included to protect inadvertent plaintiffs;" such accidents
will happen only if plaintiffs decide to take risks, either reasonably or
unreasonably. Thus, the clear conclusion of such a decision would be
that the defendant is in a far better position than plaintiffs to pre-
vent such accidents, and such a conclusion should not be undone by
the application of comparative negligence.
One might argue that by using comparative negligence we will
be providing a pressure point on plaintiffs as a class to prevent in-
juries as well as defendants. Clearly, when we are considering
voluntary activity on the part of plaintiffs, this is a worthwhile con-
sideration, but I believe in balance it fails. First, if we create a duty
to design safety into the product in a situation in which, if injuries
occur, they will almost certainly result from some voluntary activity
on the part of plaintiff, the net result is that in every case some
reduction of award is bound to take place. Since that is the nature of
the beast, we really have not created a full duty of safety, but
something like a half-duty. Perhaps the short answer to a plaintiff
deterrent argument is that the defendant's safety device would have
eliminated plaintiff misjudgment, a goal which the law should foster
totally, not partially. Second, and more important, we dare not fool
ourselves as to the kinds of questions which will occupy the minds
of jurors in assessing the fault apportionment. They will not only be
assessing the reasonableness of the plaintiffs activity, they will be
taking into account the pressure of the job, the state of unemploy-
ment, the ease of plaintiff entry into the job market, whether plain-
tiff is working by the hour or under an incentive plan, etc. One must
consider whether such fundamental policy questions should be com-
promised by comparative negligence or should rather be squarely
confronted by a court. My own strong preference is for a clean-cut
duty decision.'" Those who disagree will have to own up to the reali-
ty that major law-making responsibility is being delegated to juries.
What will emerge are not crisp rules which will provide manufac-
turers and employers with guidance about their societal respon-
'"See cases cited in note 17 supra.
"See Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in
the Products Liability Area, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1, 21 (1974).
"See note 44 supra.
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sibilities, but rather an untutored compromise translated into the
language of percentage fault.
C. Testing the Product Within the Normal Use Tolerance
The clearest case in which the plaintiffs negligence ought not to
be a factor in recovery arises from express warranty cases. The
classic case is, of course, Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co.' In
Bahlman, the defendant auto manufacturer expressly warranted
that its car roof had no seams and no ragged edges. Plaintiffs car
overturned as a result of his negligent driving and his head was cut
by the jagged edges of the seam. Rejecting the contention that con-
tributory negligence should be a bar, the court said:
Under such rule, although a manufacturer had falsely adver-
tised that a windshield was made of shatterproof glass, as in
the now famous case of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., . . . he
would be allowed to escape the consequences of that
deliberate misrepresentation because the plaintiff was ex-
ceeding the speed limit when a pebble flew up and shattered
the glass .... It is undoubtedly true that [in the instant case]
the negligence of the driver caused the car to overturn, but
defendant's representations were not for the purpose of
avoiding an accident, but in order to avoid or lessen the
serious damages that might result therefrom. . . . The par-
ticular construction of the roof of defendant's cars was
represented as protection against the consequences of just
such careless driving as actually took place. Once the an-
ticipated overturning of the car did occur, it would be il-
logical to excuse the defendant from responsibility for these
very consequences. 1
A more recent example, in which the warranty aspect is less ex-
plicit, is Vernon v. Lake Motors.2 About eight and one-half months
after the Vernons purchased a Mercury Marquis, Mr. Vernon drove
the car and noticed smoke coming from the windshield wipers. In ad-
dition, the wipers would not shut off. His local Ford agency refused
to fix the car since he had not purchased the car through that agency.
Mrs. Vernon decided to drive the car forty miles to Salt Lake
City the morning immediately following the "smoking event." Her
'290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).
"Id, 288 N.W. at 311-12.
"26 Utah 2d 269, 488 P.2d 302 (1971).
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reasons for doing so were several. First, she wanted to take the car
to Lake Motors, the agency from which she purchased the car, for
its 10,000-mile check-up. Second, she wanted to attend a dance
recital in which her grandaughter was to perform. Concerned about
the smoking incident, Mrs. Vernon went out to the car, turned the
motor on, and let it run to see if smoke was accumulating in the car.
The wipers would not turn off but, since it was storming, she need-
ed them in any event. Her testimony was that she believed the
worst that could happen was that some fuses would blow out. About
three-fourths of the way to Salt Lake City, a fire started under the
instrument panel and the car was devoured by fire.
In evaluating the contention that plaintiff's contributory
negligence, as distinguished from assumption of the risk, ought to
bar her recovery, the court said:
[F]irst, we agree with the principle that even if there be
breach of warranty, there may be circumstances under
which the plaintiffs own conduct would preclude his
recovery. We are aware that it is sometimes said that con-
tributory negligence is not a defense to such an action. This
may well be true if the effect of his conduct is simply to put
the warranty to the test; this does not and should not
eliminate the warranty, nor defeat a plaintiff's right to
proper recovery for its breach."3
The court then considered whether the plaintiff had voluntarily and
unreasonably assumed a known risk. Here, too, the court considered
the fact that plaintiff had good reason to believe that nothing would
be seriously wrong with a new car and remanded the issue for jury
determination as to whether plaintiffs conduct was voluntary and
unreasonable.
It should be noted that the warranty in this case was the stand-
ard new car warranty and not one specifically directed at some
special aspect of product performance, as in Bahlman. Nevertheless,
the court held that the general reliance of plaintiff on the represen-
tations of product liability should bar utilization of contributory
negligence as a defense absent a clear case of assumption of the
risk. Plaintiffs have a right to expect that a product will perform as
represented. What is most interesting in the Vernon case is the
court's willingness to consider the manufacturer's representations
despite the fact that evidence of product failure had come to the
plaintiffs attention. The court apparently agreed that even when a
product is malfunctioning the plaintiff may justifiably believe that
"Id, 488 P.2d at 304 (emphasis added).
1977]
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
the product is not unreasonably dangerous -i.e., the most that could
happen is that a fuse would blow. For reasons which I shall go into
shortly, I believe that this well may be an appropriate case for com-
parative negligence; yet, it is significant that the Utah court
recognized that testing the warranty is generally not grounds for
denying a plaintiff recovery on the basis of contributory fault.
The Vernon case raises rather special problems, because the
plaintiff had reason to believe that something serious was wrong
with his product. The classic case of "testing the warranty" in
modern product liability law falls between Bahlman and Vernon. Its
paradigm is demonstrated by the following hypothetical:
Plaintiff is injured when a poorly beaded tire on his car
blows out. At the time of the accident the plaintiff is
speeding twenty miles per hour over the limit. There is
evidence that had plaintiff been driving at the lawful speed
limit he would have been able to bring his car under control
and could have avoided impact with another car.
Note that in this instance we are not dealing with a highly specific
warranty such as Bahlman; nor are we confronting a plaintiff who
has some specific knowledge that something is wrong with the pro-
duct. The problem here is what the authorities have called con-
tributory negligence in failing "to guard against" the possible ex-
istence of a defect." In reality, this description of the problem is a
misnomer, because the true negligence of the plaintiff is not in fail-
ing to consider the possibility that the product might fail while in
negligent use. Why should the plaintiff consider the possibility of
product failure at a speed of fifty miles per hour? Clearly, he would
not be negligent if he was travelling fifty miles per hour in a fifty
mile per hour zone. Why should he guard against the defect merely
because he is travelling fifty miles per hour in a thirty mile per hour
zone? The true question is whether non-product contributory
negligence-generally negligent conduct unrelated to the pro-
duct-should bar the plaintiff in a case against a defendant manufac-
turer.
In this type of case, I believe that the analogy is very close to
Bahiman: plaintiff's negligence should not enter at all into the pro-
duct liability action even under the guise of comparative negligence.
The plaintiff has been sold a product which has created in his mind
a set of consumer expectations with regard to performance. At fifty
miles per hour the plaintiff has a right to total reliance on the
assumption that the product will function as marketing has
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
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represented. It is of no great consequence that we may not be able
to make out a technical case of express warranty or misrepresenta-
tion; the realities to the consumer are precisely the same. In short,
when the consumer is using the product within the clear parameters
of its normal functioning mode, the general or non-product con-
tributory negligence should not enter into the picture, even as com-
parative negligence. The factor of reliance on product performance
is so significant that it is simply unfair to penalize the plaintiff for
relying on the set of consumer expectations which the defendant led
him to rely upon.
IV. APPROPRIATE USE OF COMPARATIVE NEGIGENCE IN
PRODUCT LIABILITY
A. Plaintiff's Duty-Maintenance and Repair
The thrust of my objection to the use of comparative negligence
in products liability has been that plaintiffs role in product failure is
insignificant. If the defendant-manufacturer bears responsibility for
product integrity, that responsibility ought not to be diminished
because of certain kinds of plaintiff behavior which are not directed
to product integrity. There are, however, cases in which it is quite
correct for the law to require plaintiff to address himself to the
question of product performance. In such cases, either because of
the nature of the product or the nature of the product failure under
consideration, it is just, as a matter of policy, to ask the plaintiff to
become a product risk-avoider. 6
In our earlier discussion, we focused on Vernon v. Lake Motors,"5
in which the car signalled to its user that it was in need of repair.
As a matter of policy, we must recognize that we live in a world
where products break down for a variety of reasons. If the product
has signalled to its user, "fix me," and if a reasonable person under
the circumstances should have undertaken repair, it would seem ap-
propriate to reduce the plaintiffs verdict by the percentage of his
fault. Note that in this instance there are concrete, constructive
steps that plaintiff should have undertaken to help in restoring pro-
duct integrity. Certain products will demand that maintenance and
repair be undertaken. They call for a joint responsibility between
manufacturer and consumer. Admittedly, the problem arises from a
defect in the product which should not have been there. Yet the
nature of the product is such that society will place duties on the
"
5 Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055 (1972).
'26 Utah 2d 269, 488 P.2d 302 (1971).
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consumer to help in maintaining its integrity. There are many
reasons for this in the case of automobiles. The auto is a product
designed for long-term use. Regular inspections are necessary, in
any event, for general safety purposes, and it is well known that
debugging problems with automobiles are such that periodic checks
are necessary. For all these reasons, it becomes clear that plaintiff
plays a role in repair and maintenance and it is thus fair to appor-
tion the loss which arises from the failure of both parties to meet
their joint burden with regard to product liability.
B. Product Misuse-Pushing the Product to Its Limits
In our earlier discussion, we focused on a plaintiff who was
speeding on a poorly-beaded tire which failed at fifty miles per hour,
a use of the product which was within the clear parameters of nor-
mal use. This fact situation represents the problems that exist at
one polarity. For the reasons discussed earlier, I believe that com-
parative negligence should not be utilized to reduce plaintiff's
recovery where the use is so clearly within the represented perfor-
mance capabilities of the product. At the other extreme lie the cases
in which the product misuse is so extraordinary that even if there is
a defect we are unprepared to impose liability, since our judgment
is that the product defect is not the proximate cause of the harm.57
Thus, if tires designed and sold to be used only for normal driving
are used for stock-car racing at extremely high speeds, recovery will
be denied. It will be denied even if the product was, in fact, defec-
tive and a cause in fact of the harm. The use to which the product
has been put is such that we are unwilling to saddle the manufac-
turer for losses which arise from activity which is so tangentially
related to the product he has marketed. There does, however, exist
a middle range in which comparative fault could play a role. Perhaps
in a world of more honest and forthright marketing there would be
no need to consider the interplay we are about to examine.
However, in the real world it is clear that the scope of foreseeable
use is a very delicate question. Consumers often use products to the
very edge of the product's capabilities, and it is in this gray area
where many accidents occur. One might argue that it is a manufac-
turer's duty to clearly identify the limits of product performance,
but the millenium has yet not arrived. What we often encounter is a
7McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1963); Helene- Curtis Indus.
v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Com-
ment h (1965); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and
Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93 (1972).
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product whose use parameters are not well-defined and a plaintiff
who knows that he is probably pushing the product to its limits and
perhaps beyond. In this kind of situation, comparative negligence
can play a role.
Hoelter v. Mohawk Service, Inc." raises the problem. Plaintiff
was speeding along in his 1964 MGB sports car at a rate of approx-
imately eighty miles per hour. The posted speed limit was fifty-five
miles per hour. He had attempted to overtake another car and when
he tried to return to his lane the car began to fishtail. The car went
out of control, seriously injuring the plaintiff. Plaintiffs MGB was
outfitted with Pirelli studded snow tires. It was his contention that
the accident was caused by the manner in which the metal studs had
been inserted. Defendant, of course, claimed that the plaintiffs driv-
ing was the sole cause of the accident. The advertising brochure for
the Pirelli tires read as follows:
"A remarkable snow tire ... Step on the accelerator, change
gears, take a curve or hit the brakes-Pirelli Invernos grip
... and hold . .. When using studded tires sustained speeds
should not exceed 70 miles per hour."
If the plaintiff were speeding at sixty-five miles per hour and the
tires failed, thus contributing to his injuries, I would argue that
plaintiffs speeding should neither bar nor reduce his recovery
against the tire manufacturer. Plaintiff had been encouraged to use
the tire at substantial speed with the assurance that the tire will
not fail. But intermittent speeds of eighty miles per hour are clearly
a problem area. The manufacturer has not clearly proscribed this
kind of use, but plaintiff has grounds to believe that the product is
being tested at its limits. To reduce plaintiffs recovery against the
manufacturer in this instance by a percentage of his fault thus
seems altogether proper.
V. TRADING CAUSE FOR FAULT
It is standard practice when teaching comparative negligence to
freshman law students to emphasize the difference between appor-
tionment of damages and comparative negligence, either between
plaintiff and defendant or two defendant tortfeasors. Traditional
teaching is that a defendant should never pay for a harm which he
did not cause.5' Thus, for example, when it is clear that one defen-
dant injured the plaintiffs right arm and another his left arm, each
"170 Conn. 495, 365 A.2d 1064 (1976).
"W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 236 (4th ed. 1971).
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defendant will pay only for the harm he caused." If, on the other
hand, we have concurrent tortfeasors who have caused a plaintiff a
single indivisible injury, then both are jointly and severally liable. 1
In a contribution action, if damages are to be apportioned between
them, apportionment will not be based on the dollar amount of
damages they respectively caused, since that cannot be determined,
but on the basis of comparative fault."2 Similarly, under the doctrine
of avoidable consequences, when a plaintiff is responsible for adding
to the harm which defendant brought upon him, his recovery is
reduced by the amount which his own negligence caused."3 On the
other hand, when the harm is single and indivisible, the plaintiff's
negligence, in a comparative negligence jurisdiction, reduces his
recovery by the percentage of the plaintiff's fault."4
In short, cause in fact is an all-or-nothing question. If harm can
be clearly identified as attributable to one party, then we are faced
with an apportionment of damages question based on cause in fact. If
the harm cannot be logically identified as emanating from one
source or another, then the damages must be apportioned on some
basis of fault.
This analysis, although simple and straightforward, will no
longer suffice. From a broad range of sources, we are coming to
learn that the comparative fault doctrine may signal the beginning
of the end of the all-or-nothing causation principle. If, indeed, my
reading of the signals is correct, we may be witnessing a significant
revolution in the law of torts. The seat-belt cases have brought the
issues into sharp focus. Courts have differed sharply in their ap-
proach to this problem. Most have rejected the defense entirely.65
'Louis v. Oakley, 50 Haw. 260, 438 P.2d 393 (1968); McAllister v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 324 Pa. 65, 187 A. 415 (1936).
"Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat'l Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974);
Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961).
"
2The majority rule, until the advent of comparative fault, held that contribution
should be equal, depending on the number of joint tortfeasors. See W. PROSSER, J.
WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASE AND MATERIAL ON TORTS (6th ed. 1976). The trend toward
a comparative fault principle in contribution received strong impetus from the land-
mark decision of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). See Aushel, The Impact of New York's Judicially Created Law
Apportionment Amongst Tortfeasors, 38 ALBANY L. REV. 155 (1974). The May 1, 1977
draft of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, Section 4 adopts the comparative fault
principle for contribution.
"
3 Green v. Smith, 261 Cal. App. 2d 392, 67 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1968); Dohmann v.
Richard, 282 So. 2d 789 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Zimmerman v. Ausland, 266 Ore. 427, 513
P.2d 1167 (1973).
"See generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974).
"Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970); Clark v. State, 28 Conn.
Super. 398, 264 A.2d 366 (1970); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d
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However, two courts that have seen fit to recognize the defense
have taken very different approaches to the problem of reducing the
plaintiff's recovery.
A. Apportionment of Damages
In Spier v. Barker," the New York Court of Appeals, prior to
the adoption of its comparative fault statute, adopted the seat-belt
defense."1 It took the position that plaintiff should have his recovery
reduced by the amount the injury would have been reduced had the
plaintiff been wearing his seat belt. Thus, if defendant were travell-
ing thirty miles per hour over the speed limit and lost control of his
car, colliding with a non-belted plaintiff, the defendant would only be
liable for the damages caused by the first, car against car, collision.
The defendant would not be liable for the add-on injuries which
resulted because the plaintiff failed to wear his seat belt. It should
be noted that this is a straight cause-in-fact analysis. Defendant
should only be liable for the damages which he caused. Since plain-
tiff had an opportunity to mitigate damages in advance of the acci-
dent by buckling up-a case of avoidable consequences-he is re-
quired to bear that loss."
B. Comparative Negligence
In Bentzler v. Braun," the Wisconsin court faced the same ques-
tion and decided that the plaintiff's award in a seat-belt case should
be reduced by the percentage of plaintiff's fault. If there is evidence
that a causal relationship exists between the failure to wear the
seat belt and the aggravation of plaintiff's injuries, fault apportion-
ment between the parties can be undertaken .7 Thus, in seeking to
606 (1969); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968); Robinson v. Lewis, 254
Or. 52, 457 P.2d 483 (1969).
"35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974).
"
7New York adopted the "pure" form of comparative negligence for causes of ac-
tion accruing on or after Sept. 1, 1975. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 1413 (McKinney Supp.
1975). It is possible that New York would have opted for the comparative negligence
approach to the seat belt question rather than the avoidable consequences approach if
New York had approved a comparative negligence doctrine at the time the court was
faced with Spier v. Barker, 42 App. Div. 428, 431, 348 N.Y.S.2d 581, 583 (1973). There
is an intimation to that effect in the Appellate Division decision. See text accompany-
ing note 72 infra.
6835 N.Y.2d 444, 451, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 921 (1974).
"34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
"'It should be noted that even under Bentzler v. Braun there must be evidence
that there was a causal relationship between the failure to wear the seat belt and the
aggravated injuries. This is, however, far different from the approach of the New York
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discover a method of reducing plaintiffs recovery in a seat-belt case,
the Wisconsin court shunned an apportionment of damages or cause-
in-fact analysis and opted for a comparative fault approach.
The Wisconsin approach to the problem appears to be far
superior to that dictated by Spier v. Barker." In the hypothetical
discussed earlier, defendant was speeding at thirty miles per hour
over the limit and crossed the median strip, colliding with the plain-
tiffs car, throwing the plaintiff and injuring him seriously. Let us
assume that total damages were $100,000. If expert testimony
establishes that if plaintiff had been wearing a seat belt he would
have suffered only $10,000 damages, then his recovery will be
limited to that amount. The $90,000 add-on injuries would fall on the
plaintiff, since they were due to his failure to buckle up. This would
be the result of apportioning damages under Spier. Under the
Wisconsin comparative fault approach, a jury would be entitled to
reduce plaintiffs recovery by assessing plaintiffs fault in the overall
injury situation. It would appear that the Wisconsin result would
come closer to rendering justice in this situation.
C. Apportioning Damages and Then Comparing Fault
A third resolution of this problem might be to first apportion
damages and then to accomplish the fault comparison on the second-
collision or add-on injuries. The reasoning would be that the defen-
dant is clearly responsible for all of the injuries which would have
occurred even if the plaintiff had been wearing the seat belt, and
the plaintiff is thus entitled to an undiminished recovery with
regard to these injuries. It is only with regard to the add-on injuries
that the fault comparison should be undertaken, since it is only with
regard to the add-on injuries that joint fault took effect.
D. Comparing the Various Methods of Reducing Plaintiff's Claim
As I have already indicated, it would appear that the method
which reduces plaintiffs award by apportioning damages can yield
very harsh results. The fault apportionment is simple to administer
but would seem unfair in that it deprives plaintiff of a percentage of
award for which the defendant is clearly totally responsible. The
third approach-apportioning damages and then apportioning
fault-would seem to be the most sound analytical scheme for handl-
ing the problem.
court in Spier v. Barker, 42 App. Div. 428, 348 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1973), where an exact
damage apportionment was required to reduce damages.
"135 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974).
[Vol. 10:797
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The matter cannot, however, be disposed of so easily. Lest we
forget, the courts have indicated reluctance to turn the courtroom
into a theater for accident reconstruction games in which experts
testify as to the hypothetical results which would have occurred had
the plaintiff been wearing his seat belt. 2 Even in the case of simple
fault apportionment, the jury is certain to have some evidence as to
how significantly the seat belt would have reduced damages. To be
sure, the exactness of a damage apportionment will be missing from
the case, but the record will not be barren as to the possible saving
effects of the seat belt. Taking this into consideration, it may well
be that the Wisconsin method of straight fault apportionment is still
the soundest approach. The jury will not be subjected to detailed
evidence about the precise amount of damages that could have been
averted by wearing a seat belt; they will simply make a gross judg-
ment, taking into consideration the evidence on fault and the
evidence on causation in one fell swoop.
E. Trading Cause for Fault
It should be evident that what we have been discussing is a
phenomenon which can have broad application to the entirety of tort
law. If in a cause-in-fact case what the New York court calls appor-
tionment of damages the Wisconsin court treats as apportionment of
fault, then perhaps the problems are not as discrete as our law pro-
fessors have taught us to believe. The possibility of compromising
both cause-in-fact and proximate cause questions, so that the percen-
tage fault question would reflect our inability to make all-or-nothing
decisions with regard to these issues, is an option which must be
seriously considered. I would suggest that in addition to the seat-
belt cases, recent cases in fairly unrelated areas have broached the
compromise. Although, in general, the courts did not confront the
topic with the kind of clarity that academicians would prefer, the
cases speak for themselves.
1. Huddell v. Levin-A Strange Confession
On the early morning of March 24, 1970, Dr. Huddell, a
psychiatrist, was driving his 1970 Chevrolet Nova en route to the
Delaware State Hospital, where he was engaged in psychiatric
research." Dr. Huddell had purchased the car new and had installed
"
2Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970); Lipscomb v. Diamini,
226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967).
7Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976). This decision vacated a superb
opinion by Judge Cohen of the district court, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975).
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head restraints as original equipment for both the driver and the
front passenger seats. While travelling on the Delaware Memorial
Bridge, Dr. Huddell's car ran out of gas. His car was brought to a
full stop in the left-most southbound lane of traffic. He was seated
belted in the driver's seat, and the blinker lights on his vehicle were
in operation. The accident occurred when another car rear-ended the
Huddell car at a considerable rate of speed. Upon impact, Dr. Hud-
dell's head struck the head restraint on his car, resulting in exten-
sive fracture to the occipital region of the skull. Because of a
medical phenomenon known as "countercoup," by which the brain of
a moving head striking a stationary object sustains injury opposite
the point of impact, the frontal portions of Dr. Huddell's brain were
extensively damaged. He died one day after the accident.
Plaintiffs brought suit against General Motors, Levin, the driver
of the car which rear-ended Dr. Huddell, and Levin's employer, for
whom he was driving at the time of the accident. The focus of the
Huddell opinion, in the main, was with the liability of General
Motors. It was the plaintiffs' contention that the head restraints
were defective because they were designed with a relatively sharp
edge of unyielding metal which allowed for excessive concentration
of forces against the rear of the skull. As a result, the head came in
contact with a thin metal plate rather than a flat surface which
would have distributed the force over a larger area of the skull.
The Third Circuit, on appeal, affirmed the jury finding on defect.
It then turned to a troublesome question. General Motors was clear-
ly liable only for second-collision or add-on injuries caused by its
defective head restraints. It was not liable for the harm caused to
Dr. Huddell as a result of the primary collision. The two successive
collisions-(1) Levin's car against Huddell's car, causing some injury
to Huddell, and (2) Huddell against the defective head
restraint-came in rapid-fire succession. It would be difficult, if not
impossible, to divide the two events and separate the harms caused
by each. The lower court took the position that these facts should be
analogized to the chain-collision cases." New Jersey had taken the
position in those cases that the successive colliders should be
treated as concurrent tortfeasors and thus jointly and severally
liable for the entire injury, unless the defendant-the second col-
lider-is able to prove that his damages are separable and that the
amount of damages attributable to him are determinable."6 For all
7395 F. Supp. at 73.
7 Dziedzic v. St. John's Cleaners & Shirt Launderers, Inc., 53 N.J. 157, 249 A.2d
382 (1968); Hill v. Macomber, 103 N.J. Super. 127, 246 A.2d 731 (1968); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
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the persuasiveness of the analogy, Chief Judge Aldisert was unwill-
ing to adopt it in a second-collision product liability case:
The crashworthy or second-collision theory of liability is a
relatively new theory, its contours are not wholly mapped,
but one thing, at least is clear; the automobile manufacturer
is liable only for the enhanced injuries attributable to the
defective product. This being the essence of the liability, we
cannot agree that the burden of proof on that issue can prop-
erly be placed on the manufacturer."
So be it. The court, faced with a novel cause of action, was not
prepared to treat this as anything other than a problem of appor-
tionment of damages with the traditional burden of proof resting on
the plaintiff. But then in a dramatic turnabout at the close of the
opinion, the court made the following suggestion for the trial judge
on remand:
Upon retrial, the district court may request the parties to
consider whether the New Jersey Supreme Court would be
receptive to a rule kindred to the apportionment rule an-
nounced by the New York Court of Appeals in Dole v. Dow
Chemical Co. that where a third party is found to have been
responsible for a part, but not all, of the negligence for
which a defendant is cast in damages, the responsibility for
that part is recoverable by the prime defendant against the
third party. To reach that end there must necessarily be an
apportionment of responsibility in negligence between those
parties. The adjudication is one of fact and may be sought in
a separate action . . . or as a separate and distinguishable
issue by bringing in the third party in the prime action."
The court recognized that this was a situation somewhat different
from the normal comparison of fault between joint tortfeasors. Dole,
they said:
[d]id not implicate a combination of negligence and products
liability; and it did not implicate the troublesome-and in
our view sui generis-concept of second collision liability ...
it did represent a salutary judicial reevaluation of a tired
common law doctrine that had long outlived purposes. The
common law must accommodate changing conditions, new
rights and remedies."
'5537 F.2d at 738.
7Id. at 741 (citations omitted), citing Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y. 2d 143, 282
N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
"Id. at 742.
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For all the language which indicates that the court is breaking
new ground, the opinion fails to reveal just how novel the court's
suggestion truly is. It will be recalled that the majority recoiled at
the suggestion that the negligent driver and General Motors be
treated as joint and several tortfeasors. The problem was one of ap-
portionment of damages. General Motors, the second of the tort-
feasors, was to be held liable only for the add-on injuries. Then,
after reflection, the court suggested that General Motors and the
driver Levin apportion not damages, but fault between them. Thus,
for example, the driver might be found forty percent at fault and
General Motors sixty percent at fault. It is irrelevant at this time to
speculate whether this kind of apportionment would limit the liabili-
ty of each party to the percentage of his own fault or whether, as in
Dole, the parties would be jointly and severally liable to the plain-
tiff, with their rights inter se being affected by the fault appor-
tionment." The crucial point is that the court, faced with a difficult
damage apportionment in which the plaintiff may be unable to
segregate the harm caused by the second collision, has recognized
that a tough damage question may perhaps best be resolved in fault
apportionment.
2. Barry v. Manglass-A Step Toward Comparative Causation
The story of Barry v. Manglassl* is a fascinating one. The sup-
posedly major point for which the case will be cited is of anecdotal
interest and will pass into twilight with other judicial opinions
which deal with the auto recall question." But for the cogniscenti,
there lies hidden in the depths of this decision a veritable gold mine,
of which it may be said, "Observe, tis truly new.""2
The facts are humdrum. Gary Manglass was driving his 1969
Chevrolet Nova and took a turn on Old Route 202 going south at six-
ty miles per hour, clearly a foolhardy action. Apparently, upon
reaching the southbound lane the car suddenly went out of control
and began weaving from one lane to another. It ultimately hit a car
in the northbound lane in which plaintiff Barry and others were oc-
cupants. Barry brought suit against Manglass for negligent driving
and also joined General Motors as a defendant. The claim against
"V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, §§ 16.3, 16.4, 16.7. See N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507: 7-a (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN., art. 2212a, § 2(c) (West Supp. 1976-1977).
"55 App. Div. 2d 1, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1976).
"See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 345 N.E.2d 683 (Mass.
1976).
"Ecclesiastes 1:10.
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General Motors was that the 1969 Chevy Nova was manufactured
with defective motor mounts which caused the car to go out of con-
trol.
The battle of the experts followed. Which came first-the
chicken or the egg? Did the motor mounts fail, thus causing the colli-
sion, or did the collision occur first, thus causing the motor mounts
to break? It was the contention of General Motors that the failure of
the motor mounts followed Manglass' loss of control after he made
the turn at too great a speed. On the other hand, the plaintiffs ex-
perts contended that the motor-mount failure preceded the acci-
dent and caused an unintended increase in the speed of the car as it
was making the turn. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and,
under the dictate of Dole v. Dow, which permits apportionment of
fault between joint tortfeasors, found the liability of General Motors
at thirty-five percent and that of Manglass at sixty-five percent.
A fault apportionment between tortfeasors on the basis of a
percentage comparison is nothing novel. However, before one can
assess fault against a tortfeasor causation must be established. The
controversy in this case did not surround the issue of fault. There
was evidence that General Motors had serious difficulties with the
motor mounts on the 1969 Chevy Nova, and there was clear
evidence that the driver was negligent. The battle of the experts
was based on an assumption that a defect existed in the product
when it left the hands of the manufacturer. The question to be
decided was whether the harm was caused by the defect or the driv-
ing of Manglass. On this point the experts split sharply; the expert
for General Motors claimed that the motor mounts failed post-
collision and the plaintiff contended that it failed pre-collision.
The jury verdict on fault apportionment assessing thirty-five
percent to General Motors and sixty-five percent to Manglass is dif-
ficult to reconcile with the testimony of the experts. If either of the
experts is believed, then even if the fault of the parties can be
assessed the cause aspect of the case cannot be compromised. Causa-
tion is, after all, an either/or issue. The motor mounts failed either
before the collision or after the collision. If they failed after the colli-
sion, it would not seem to matter how much at fault General Motors
was in bringing about the condition. It is possible, of course, that
the jury found that both General Motors and the driver were con-
current tortfeasors, in that the defect of the car coincided with the
negligent driving of the defendant Manglass to cause the accident,
but the probabilities are strongly against such coincidence, since the
expert testimony appears to have been unequivocal. If the jury did
arrive at such a finding, it would be unsupported by the evidence
which presented causation as an all-or-nothing issue.
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There is an explanation for the jury finding that supports the
thesis I have set forth. The normal standard of proof on causation is
that plaintiff must establish the causal connection by the balance of
probabilities." If it is more probable than not that the defendant
caused the harm, then causation is one hundred percent established.
If it is less probable, then plaintiff has failed to make out his case.
But, we all know that causation is never proven at a one hundred
percent or a zero percent level. We treat the proof problem in a
manner that is unrelated to reality. If, however, juries are
presented with a mechanism to allow them to take into account the
likelihood, at a percentage basis, that the defendant's fault caused
the harm, then causation could be easily compromised and the issue
removed from its all-or-nothing shibboleth." Comparative fault
presents to juries the mechanism for compromising difficult cause-in-
fact questions. Again, it is possible that the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act takes causation into account:
In determining the percentage of fault allocable to each
party, the trier of fact shall consider, on a comparative basis,
both the nature and quality of the conduct of the party and
the extent to which and directness with which the conduct
contributed to cause the damages claimed."
Certainly it might help to clarify matters if the Act specifically pro-
vided for cause in fact as well as proximate cause," but that is a
'3W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 241 (4th ed. 1971).
"See generally Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's
Liability, 81 U. PENN. L. REV. 586 (1933); Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of
Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CH. L. REV. 69 (1975). The basic thesis
reflected in the text is touched on by Professor Owen in his symposium article, The
Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer, supra note 12. See also text accompanying notes
57-58 supra. Professor Owen argues:
Thus, questions of causal linkage, rather than directly concerning
metaphysical cause and effect, primarily involve questions of fairness to the
parties concerning the degree of proof required to establish metaphysical
causation. "The tendency to temper rules to fit moral conduct ... in the field
of certainty of proof' has been recognized on the damages side of tort law
for some time. Courts have tended to administer the rules of causation "in
such manner as to be most severe upon the intentional wrongdoer and more
severe upon the reckless wrongdoer than upon the negligent wrongdoer."
Thus, the manufacturer's blameworthiness may properly bear on the resolu-
tion of the cause in fact issue in certain products liability cases.
Id at 780 (footnotes omitted).
"May 1, 1977 Draft, supra note 32, at § 2(b).
"The following modification is suggested: In determining the percentage of fault
allocable to each party, the trier of fact shall consider, on a comparative basis, both the
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minor matter. The tendency of courts to treat the cause-in-fact ques-
tion in proximate cause terminology is well known.8 The mechanism
thus exists for plaintiffs to press comparative fault on the courts as
a solution to difficult cause-in-fact questions. Comparative fault in
the product liability area may yet turn out to be a substantial boon
for claimants who may be able to use it to withstand directed ver-
dicts and jury verdicts when evidence is less than overwhelming on
causation.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have come full circle. Having begun this analysis on the
premise that comparative fault is a damaging and unfair doctrine to
apply indiscriminately against plaintiffs in product liability actions,
we have concluded that it may yet turn out to be a boon to plaintiffs
who face difficult causation problems. Yet, we need not abandon
either position. Courts will have to examine each case on its facts to
determine whether a fault comparison is proper. In some instances,
it is clear that any reduction of plaintiff's recovery will negate basic
duties that have been placed on manufacturers." In other instances,
nature and quality of the conduct of the party and the causal relation, both in the
cause-in-fact and proximate cause sense, with which the conduct contributed to cause
the damages claimed.
It should be noted that the May 1, 1977 Draft, supra note 32, provides in section
1 (b):
(b) "Fault" includes negligence, recklessness, breach of implied warranty,
conduct subjecting the actor to strict tort liability, unreasonable assumption
of risk, and failure to avoid or mitigate damage. The fault must have an ade-
quate causal relationship to the damage suffered
(emphasis added).
The statement that fault must be causal must be related back to section 2 (b), which
states that directness of fault is to be considered as an apportionment factor. The clear
inference from section 1 (b) is that causation is an all-or-nothing decision. The inference
from section 2 (b) is to the contrary. For reasons set forth in the text, the author
favors eliminating cause-in-fact as an all-or-nothing issue, and it is suggested that the
last sentence of section 1 (b) be eliminated and the author's modification be
substituted.
7W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 236, 244 (4th ed. 1971); Owen, The Highly Blame-
worthy Manufacturer, supra note 12. See also text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
"It is interesting to note that the original draft of the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act provided in section 1 that:
In an action for injury to person or property, based on negligence [of any
kind], recklessness, [wanton misconduct], strict liability or breach of warran-
ty, or a tort action based on a statute unless otherwise indicated by statute
any contributory fault on the part of, or attributed to, the claimant, or of any
other person whose fault might otherwise have affected the claimant's
recovery, does not bar the recovery but diminishes the award of compen-
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a fault comparison will be proper because plaintiff has a role to
fulfill in maintaining product safety. When causation is seriously at
issue, there may be yet another role for comparative fault to play.
If mishandled, comparative fault can become an excuse for avoiding
important decision-making. In the hands of a creative judiciary, com-
parative fault can contribute to a system of product liability that is
both just in theory and practical in result.
satory damages proportionately, according to the measure of fault attributed
to the claimant. This Section applies whether the contributory fault previous-
ly constituted a defense or not, and replaces previous common law and
statutory rules concerning the effect of contributory fault, including last
clear chance and unreasonable assumption of risk.
(emphasis added). The comment to this proposed statute takes special note of the
underlined language. It states:
Unless otherwise indicated by the statute is to keep from repealing by im-
plication and to give a court the authority to construe a statute such as a
child labor act to prevent any mitigation if it thinks the policy of the act re-
quires protection of a class of persons even against their own weaknesses or
inadequacies.
The May 1, 1977 Draft, supra note 32, eliminates the underlined language. This author
has it on the good authority of Professor John Wade that the drafters did not intend
by this omission to change the sense of the original draft. Thus, there is recognition
that there may be circumstances prescribed by statute where certain classes of plain-
tiffs need the protection of the law and these persons should be entitled to full rather
than partial recovery. It is the thesis of this article that in certain product liability
situations comparative fault should not reduce recovery. Thus, the author would sug-
gest restatement of the original language to read as follows:
Nothing contained in this statute shall prevent a court from refusing to apply
the comparative fault principle in any case where a statute indicates other-
wise or where in the judgment of the court the application of the com-
parative fault principle would significantly impair the purpose of the law in
assessing liability on a defendant.
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